Venezuela and the Current Fault Lines of the Great Power Politics w/ Professor Steven Ellner

View Transcript

Ryan Morfin:

Welcome to Non-Beta Alpha. I’m Ryan Morfin. On today’s episode, we have Professor Steve Ellner talking to us about Venezuela, and how it’s the front lines of great power politics today. This is Non-Beta Alpha. Professor Ellner, welcome to the show, and thank you for joining us.

Steve Ellner:

Thank you for the invitation.

Ryan Morfin:

Well, today we’re really excited to talk to you about what’s actually going on the ground in Venezuela, it’s an economy that has had a lot of political risk, a little uncertainty, economic risk, but it’s a rich country in terms of natural resources. But I think from a stability standpoint, a solvency standpoint it may be an interesting case study for our viewers to look at, as it could relate to the US economy as we start to go towards QE infinity and there could or could not be some real political risk around the corner with the upcoming general election. And so we appreciate you kind of giving us some insights today about what’s happening in Venezuela and how Venezuela arrived at its current situation. But maybe I’ll kick off the first question. How are things going in Venezuela with the coronavirus and local economy?

Steve Ellner:

Well, at first things were going quite well. As a matter of fact, in March the president, Maduro, imposed pretty strict measures, what seemed to be successful for the first couple months. March, April, May, but since early June, about the second week of June, there’s been a surge. At the same time Maduro announced what he calls seven and seven, which is seven days of lockdown and seven days of relaxing the restrictions, but on a State by State basis, so that you had I think 12 States that continue to have lockdowns. States at the border of Columbia, for instance, Zulia which is an oil producing State on the border of Columbia. So, they did not abide by these seven and seven measure, but other States did.

Steve Ellner:

So, people were able to get out of the house wearing masks but the restrictions were loosened. But perhaps as a result or perhaps as a result of an influx of Venezuelans coming into the country there has been a surge, and the vice president of Venezuela, Delcy Rodriguez announced on Friday that there were 330 cases that day or the day before. And she also announced, and they do this on a daily basis, the number of those cases that are what she called imported, which means people coming into the country, mainly from Columbia, but also some from Brazil. The government claims that there are illegal trails into the country and accuses the Colombian government. The relations between Columbia and Venezuela are quite poor. So, these accusations go back and forth, but the Venezuelan government claims that the Colombian government isn’t doing anything to hinder this movement.

Steve Ellner:

So, you have people coming into that as well from Columbia and she claims, or the statistics are that 103 of those 330 other cases involve people returning to Venezuela. The other statistic that was announced this week was 10,854 cases throughout this period, and of those a little over 100 deaths. That’s low by Latin American standards. Certainly, if you compare it to Brazil, but also Chile and Ecuador that has been very heavily affected. Peru also, that doesn’t seem that high. But what’s disturbing is the surge. The fact that the levels were quite low up until a little over a month ago. That doesn’t hold well for what may be coming for Venezuela in the coming weeks and months. But those are the official statistics. Of course, we don’t really know the real statistics but those statistics do reflect a deterioration over the last month. Venezuela is getting some support from its allies, Russia and China.

Steve Ellner:

Also, the European Union has contributed to medical equipment vis-a-vis the United Nations, the position of the government is that supplies can come in through the United Nations. But the other factor in the United States is working through the parallel government of Juan Guaido, who the United States recognizes is the only government of Venezuela. So, they’re trying to get supplies in through Guaido. Guaido mentioned about a month ago that supplies would be coming into Venezuela, but it’s kind of hard to imagine, to visualize how that will happen because he doesn’t control any territory in Venezuela. But that’s the situation as of now. Some of the supplies are coming in vis-a-vis the United Nations and others are coming in directly to the Venezuelan government from Russia and China.

Ryan Morfin:

Well, the poor folks in Venezuela, I mean, there was already issues on the economy and the food supplies. Was that real or is that an accurate statement? Because that’s what we see here in the news in US.

Steve Ellner:

No, I think that depiction is pretty much accurate. The economic situation in Venezuela has deteriorated. It’s deteriorated since president Maduro came in. Chavez died in 2013 and Maduro came in that year and shortly after Chavez’s death, there were elections. So, Maduro has been in power since 2013. But that coincides with the contraction of the commodity market, commodity prices, primary commodities being commodities that aren’t processed in the third world countries, that get processed elsewhere. And oil is one of them. And the price of oil has plunged since 2013. That has a big effect. The opposition says that the mismanaging of the Venezuela economy also is the fact that they claim it’s the factor, but you really have to consider three factors. The mistakes of the government, that in my opinion, are undeniable, the price of oil on the international level.

Steve Ellner:

Venezuelan oil was going from about $110 and then those dived to about $36. That’s going to affect any country that is so heavily dependent on oil as Venezuela is. And the third factor is the sanctions of the Trump administration. Actually, going back to the Obama government, but especially under Trump. Those are the three factors that explain the deterioration of Venezuelan economy, health has taken a big hit, food is naturally affected. And so the situation in Venezuela was pretty grim prior to the coronavirus pandemic, but the deterioration has been pretty sharp and these last couple of months.

Ryan Morfin:

And how is the health system holding up there? I don’t know the strength of it, or I’ve heard stories that Cuba has sent doctors over and there’s a lot of medical assistance between Cuba and Venezuela. How is the state of the healthcare system there?

Steve Ellner:

Yeah, well, Cuba has sent over doctors. Cuba sent over doctors for the very beginning and there were an estimated 3,000 doctors in this program that’s called in Spanish, [Spanish 00:09:21] which meant that the Cuban doctors were in the body as they were in the poor areas where Venezuelan doctors don’t set up shops. So, the Cuban set up shop in the poor areas. And so you had that from the very beginning. You’ve had that for some time, but doctors have been sent to Venezuela, just like they’ve been sent to other countries throughout the world. That is a factor, but the public health system in Venezuela is not in good shape. And I would say that the primary care under this government, so going back to Chavez was in better shape or is in better shape than the hospitals, but now with the coronavirus these cases are serious. People go to the hospitals and the hospitals were not in good shape to begin with. That’s the situation as it stands now,

Ryan Morfin:

And universities and schools, are children going back to school in the fall in Venezuela or?

Steve Ellner:

It hasn’t been announced, but I would say that it’s doubtful given the fact that the government took stringent majors from the very beginning. And now that there is a surge and the government is emphasizing the States that are not they’re not applying the seven and seven system. So, there’s a permanent lockdown in about half of the States of Venezuela. I would predict that the schools will not reopen in September.

Ryan Morfin:

Yeah, I think that’s probably going to happen here, even though they’re kicking the can down the road and they don’t want to announce it, but I think that’s what people are preparing for. So, you mentioned the oil economy and I believe Venezuela produces a lot of heavy crude and it’s typically refined up in the States. But China’s come in substantially over the last several years and has started to make bilateral loans and such. What is the state of play with the sanctions from the US, and then how has China helped buoy the government and the economy?

Steve Ellner:

Well, the sanctions have been very effective because they’ve been not only sanctions against Venezuela exporting oil to the United States and exporting oil to other countries throughout the world. But they also apply to anybody that’s involved in the transportation, the insurance in any phase of the oil industry with exception of … for service companies, Chevron and several others, and several service countries like Halliburton that were given exemptions, but those exemptions are now being are not being renewed rather. So, then a number of captains of ships, insurance companies, owners of shipping companies, they are being sanctioned, which means that their investments in the United States, any money that they have in the United States will get frozen. And oil companies as well, even Rosneft, which is the big Russian oil company that was handling the oil.

Steve Ellner:

And they were doing it sort of discretely in the sense that they were telling the United States, “We’re not receiving money for this oil, we’re just receiving money that Venezuela owes us.” And they were also transporting the oil to India. India had become a big recipient of Venezuelan oil to the tune of 300 barrels a day. And that declined to 200 or less than 200 barrels a day. But that oil, the India was not important at all directly, but it was getting shipped by Rosneft to Russia, and then shipped it to India. So, all those mechanisms were established, but then Rosneft was sanctioned and its assets in the United States were frozen. And Rosneft is partly owned by the Russian government. Also, two big oil companies have stocks, have partial ownership of Rosneft.

Steve Ellner:

So, they were affected and they decided to pull out directly from the oil transactions with Venezuela. So, it’s affected Venezuela in a big way, so much so that there reached a point in which the storage capacity of Venezuela was exhausted. They couldn’t export the oil. And even though production has reached very low levels, for a number of reasons, they couldn’t store the oil because they couldn’t export it because of all these mechanisms that were in place.

Ryan Morfin:

Yeah. I read somewhere that Venezuela only has one active well right now, you think that’s an accurate statement or they shut the cap Wells and closed down production cause there’s no exit for it? Wow. Well, that takes a lot of the asset production or economic productivity of the government’s oil company as Pedevesa. Right? Yeah. And so if we strip out the oil economy and there’s there’s a whole bunch of macro trends fracking a lot of extra supply globally, supply oil for Russia and China, putting prices down. How has the other portions of the economy? Since Maduro took over, how have they continued to evolve over the last call it seven years? And what has been the overhang, I guess of the oil industries demise, if you will, in the Venezuela? And how has it played out through the rest of the sectors?

Steve Ellner:

Well, the Venezuela it is attraction which has affected all the industries in Venezuela. Venezuela is heavily dependent on the oil. It’s actually a characteristic of oil exporting countries in the third world. There are a lot of studies that demonstrate that the dependence on oil is greater than dependence of other third world countries on their main export commodities so that in the case of the other OPEC countries the situation is similar so that when you have oral production decrease as sharply as it has in Venezuela, even before the sanctions, even before Trump’s sanctions and then you had US companies pulling out of Venezuela. These sanctions, as I mentioned before, they back to Obama. In 2015 Obama declared Venezuela a threat.

Steve Ellner:

It was actually called extra ordinary threat to US national security. And so that affected investments in Venezuela, especially US investments. Ford pulled out, Kimberly-Clark pulled out and then later on, other companies like General Motors Kellogg’s pulled out of Venezuela completely, but that kind of sends signals to the private sector of the United States that Venezuela was off limits. So, the contraction of the Venezuelan economy has a lot to do with world trends in terms of the price of oil, in terms of US policy towards Venezuela and also policies that Maduro set in place with regard to taps on profits, price controls. But I would say the biggest problematic area is the exchange control system, from going back to 2003, a dual system in which you have an official exchange rate, which is set by the government.

Steve Ellner:

It was the government will sell dollars to companies, to people who justify the need for those dollars. Say, they’re traveling abroad, or they need money to pay off a debt, or what have you. So, the government sells those dollars to Venezuelans, to the private sector in Venezuela at an artificially low level, but then people who can’t get those dollars have to go to the open market. You might want to call it a black market because up until recently it wasn’t legal, but it was tolerated. It was accepted. So, I’d say the best word is really the open market rather than the black market. But in any case, you had this dual system, and when Chavez went off to Cuba for the last time, this was late 2012 and the situation in Venezuela was kind of confusing because it was a somewhat of a power vacuum.

Steve Ellner:

Medusa was acting president, or was in charge of Venezuela, but nobody really knew what was going to happen to Chavez. And so in the context of this political instability and uncertainty, but the open market price of the dollar skyrocketed. And in a matter of months the official price was 4.3 bolivares, that’s a local currency to the dollar. The open market rate was between eight and nine bolivares. And in those months, skyrocketed to 18, 20, 30, 40, and it hasn’t stopped ever since then. It’s been going up on a daily basis. In my mind, that inability to get the exchange rate under control to maintain some kind of rational disparity between the official rate of the dollar and the non-official rate of the dollar, that has really had a big negative effect on the Venezuelan economy. So, to get back to your question, no, the entire Venezuelan economy has been affected. It’s not just the oil industry. It’s the entire economy that has been affected.

Ryan Morfin:

And so it’s this hyperinflation on the currency. I mean, do people store any value still in that currency, or are you seeing more barter economy type of transactions to start to increase?

Steve Ellner:

Th there has been a partial dollarization of the economy, which now the government accepts it. That was illegal in the sense that let’s say a condo charges a monthly fee to property holders and they couldn’t charge that in dollars. Officially, they couldn’t announce that. Now, they can. So, you have a partial dollarization of the economy, but what it means in a fact, and this has been the case of countries that have been affected by hyperinflation, Peru, Argentina, Brazil in the late ’80s. It means that people get their salary on a forth nightly basis and they go out and they buy everything they can, everything they’re going to need for those two weeks. Nobody can hold on to money because within two weeks, the depreciation such that it’s not worth nearly as much. So, they have to kind of estimate what they need in terms of food and other basic commodities and make those purchases practically the day that they get paid.

Ryan Morfin:

Interesting. So, the day you get the dollars, that’s your spot rate, and you got to spend it all to see what supplies you might need before next spot right it hits in local currency. Yeah, that’s fascinating. Well, it’s interesting because as we keep printing money in the US and other developed economies, at some point I think a similar question is going to be brought up, which is solvency of the economy. And so there has been talk about like the gold reserves leaving Venezuela, is that talked about at all in the local press there?

Steve Ellner:

Well, it’s definitely a topic. Because even though oil production has those dived gold is an area that the Venezuelan government intends on exploiting and it is, and that explains why there are dollars circulating in Venezuela that’s coming for remittances, but also from the export of Gold. The United States, as soon as Venezuela announced its intentions of exploiting the gold, this was around, I’d say 2018, the Trump administration issued an order that nobody in the United States, US citizens and other people living in the United States could not handle that gold. And so that has been also an impediment but the gold is being exported. Venezuela, I think has a second largest reserves of gold in the world. And so that has great potential for the government and it’s taking full advantage of that.

Ryan Morfin:

And so the 40 or 50 billion that the Chinese have lent over the last few years, are they, collateralizing these loans backed by gold mines and access to that? Or is it to the oil industry or is it both?

Steve Ellner:

Right. My understanding is, it’s more like $60 million. And the policy of the Chinese government, not at the outset, but after 2008, with the situation didn’t look that promising to third world countries, but in the case of Venezuela, the collateral was oil. So, the Chinese … It was touted as a win win situation, that Venezuela was getting this currency from China and China was gaining a certain amount of stability because the price was set and China was guaranteed the oil and so China could make predictions in terms of its own economy and everything else based on the price that was set for the future market of oil. But as a result, the Venezuelan government is committed to supplying China with this oil. And it puts Venezuela in a difficult situation, given the crisis situation that’s currently in.

Ryan Morfin:

Well, going back to the economy and the stock market. So, the stock market’s taken some pretty wild rides in Venezuela. Maybe you can talk a little bit about where we are today and where we’ve come in the last seven years.

Steve Ellner:

Sure. Let me just give you a little background in Karak stock market. Stock exchange was founded in 1947, and it had a heyday in the early 1990s as a result of the liberalization, the liberal reforms of the second government of Carlos Andres Perez. Perez was president, he was a pretty nationalistic leftist leaning president in the 1970s, but he came back in 1988. He became president ’89 and implemented a very liberal reforms in terms of privatization and deregulation. And the stock market did quite well in the early years. But then by the early to mid 1990s, a lot of these companies migrated to US stock exchanges. And when Chavez comes in ’98, ’99 the Karak stock exchange lost a lot a business.

Steve Ellner:

The only bright spot for the stock exchange was the selling of government bonds, but now with inflation and then the hyperinflation that was a bad business, buying bonds in the local currency it doesn’t make any sense at all. So, currently, there are only 24 various companies that are active. They’re altogether about 50 or 60 companies on the stock exchange, but 24 that are active in some ways, but not that active really to begin with. But one promising development occurred earlier this year when the owner of a rum company, Santa Teresa, very popular rum in Venezuela, good quality also. [Spanish 00:27:53] who belongs to an old standing family dating back to probably the 19th century, if not the early 20th century, so issued stock in large quantities that were traded on the stock exchange.

Steve Ellner:

And at the same time something that I think is pretty interesting that didn’t get any publicity that I see what was pretty interesting, I think that it’s worth examining in some detail, and that is, he says that there is a possibility that Venezuela will import the Chinese model of the early 1980s. Now, that means that China, which had been under [inaudible 00:28:48], very closed society, in a very closed economy, [inaudible 00:28:54] dies in the mid ’70s. And then Dan comes in and the early ’80s, and there’s an opening up of that closed economy. And I think that’s very significant that [Vomier 00:29:10] says this, firstly, because he’s not a politician, he’s not political at all, but he’s not an opposition because he’s nonpolitical, simply nonpolitical.

Steve Ellner:

And there is a big block of business people in Venezuela who are in that category, they’re not supporting the government, but they’re opposed to opposition business people who were political in the sense that they’re directly involved in politics and form part of the opposition block. There is also a block of business people who don’t support that policy so that I Vomier has been in that category from way back. And he’s saying that there is a possibility that Venezuela will go down this route, a more friendly policy towards the private sector without the scenario that the people in Washington want to predict of a regime change or a complete change or complete overhaul of economic policy and economic model.

Steve Ellner:

Basically, the way I interpret this is that policies could change and the government could become more business friendly without changing the basic orientation of the government. There was an article in the LPS, a Spanish newspaper that I read recently that made reference to Vomier statement and talked about this would mean the liberation of prices that you wouldn’t have the price controls that you have now and a number of other policies that would be beneficial to the private sector.

Ryan Morfin:

I mean, I can understand looking at China’s hyper-growth, the seduction of that model and saying those are the seeds, but China also had the rest of the world access to different markets. And so I guess without a political solution, how does the Vomier model get ignited if you will? I mean, you’re going to have to find, I think a political solution to the trading partners in the region, in the Western hemisphere.

Steve Ellner:

So, as a result of a number of factors at the international level and within Venezuelan politics, the situation has changed somewhat. And as a result you have a situation quite different from a year ago at this time in which early 2019 Juan Guaido declared himself president of Venezuela with US backing, with the backing of most Western European countries, with the backing of a lot of Latin American countries. And it looked Guaido’s political days were numbered. But in the last year things haven’t worked out according to plan. Guaido wasn’t able to unseat Chavez the day that he declared himself president on January 23rd, 2019, and attempted coo on April 30th. And then the fiasco of evasion from Columbia a month or so ago.

Steve Ellner:

That is result of public opinion Venezuela has changed quite a lot, and perhaps the most prestigious pollster, Luis Vicente Leon, of that analysis. Leon, is pro opposition, he’s anti-government, but he’s quite objective. And his polls indicate that the majority of Venezuelans, even those firmly opposed to the government, they don’t want to hear, they want to hear anybody talk about regime change. They’re interested in practical, pragmatic solutions to their problems, immediate solutions to their problems.

Steve Ellner:

And so I think that in that context, you can understand the emergence of a new political block, which really isn’t completely new. But it’s much more solidified that it wasn’t in the past, and that’s a block of opposition Congress people and several important prestigious leaders who go back to the late 1980s, who go back some time and were members of established political parties who were supporting negotiations with the government elections, not to not presidential elections, but elections for the national assembly in December.

Steve Ellner:

One of those people is Claudio Fermin. Claudio Fermin is no leftist in political. It is economic policy. In fact, he was very much associated with Carlos Andres Perez, in his second government, is a pretty conservative government. He was Perez’s protege. And so he’s conservative on economic policy, but he’s leading this effort to participate in these elections. The other factor to consider is the political context in the United States. Certainly, there were sort of a consensus between the leadership of the Democratic Party and specifically Biden and Trump in terms of be very critical of Maduro and not considering Maduro a legitimate president. But on the other hand, Trump has gone a lot further. I mean, Trump has called Maduro a nautical, a terrorist.

Steve Ellner:

And it may be that if Biden does win elections, given the dynamics and depending on who his secretary of state is, and nobody knows at this point, I think I would venture to guess that the feeling among these business people like Vomier are the moderates in the Maduro camp, and the moderates in the opposition camp that I referred to. But that there may be a change of policy, not a policy that would necessarily pull the rug out from under Guaido, but what would be more in line with countries like Spain, which recognizes Guaido but also recognizes Maduro.

Steve Ellner:

Venezuela has diplomatic relations with Spain, that is the Maduro people. There’s an ambassador in Spain. So, I think that the thinking is that the sanctions would be perhaps soften if not removed completely. And that they would be the possibility that between 2021 and 2023 you could see a change of policy, the Maduro government realizes that the economic situation is so dire that, I mean, they’re really desperate for private capital so that on both funds, you’ll have a modification of positions and maybe a new political and economic scene in Venezuela.

Ryan Morfin:

Yeah, no, it’s going to be interesting time to see how this kind of plays itself out. And I think once it does, just given the abundance of natural resources and the wealth that’s in the ground, Venezuela should really be, if it can get the political economy, a very strong economy, but I think it’s figuring out that political solution. And it seems like Juan Guaido has kind of lost momentum. I mean, I’m not on the ground there, but it just doesn’t seem there’s the over whelming support to have change. And so I guess it’s going to take another election to try to find a new stable state.

Steve Ellner:

Yeah. And as I mentioned before, the opposition is very much divided, but not only divided between this moderate block that I mentioned before, that favors participation, they favored participation in the presidential elections of 2018, which Maduro won, but has been questioned by the United States and its allies. But those people are saying that those elections were valid and that Maduro won the elections, even though they were some infractions in terms of violation of certain norms. But there wasn’t electoral fraud. So, you have a divide there between the hard line opposition. But even in the camp of the hard line opposition you have, and even more let’s use the term radical, I don’t like using that term because it’s interpreted in somebody’s way, but let’s say the more radical fringe of the opposition which is headed by Maria Corina Machado, who was a candidate for president.

Steve Ellner:

She aspired to be president back in 2012. She attacks Guaido very strongly. I mean, she calls Guaido a sellout practically. I mean, when you get defeated so many times, and when you raise such great expectations, a lot of people who support you drop out and become disillusioned. And that’s what’s happened to Guaido. I think maybe a mistake that he made was creating all these expectations, making it seem as if Maduro was going to be ousted in the matter of days. And that was a message that was definitely conveyed, not only by Guaido, but the opposition in street protests referred to in Venezuela as the [Foreign language 00:39:58], the term I don’t know where it comes from. But street protests that lasted for months, they were bloody protests in 2014, in 2017.

Steve Ellner:

And in both cases, the opposition leaders were saying, “Maduro has been overthrown in a matter of days or weeks.” And it didn’t happen. So, I think that as a result of a repetition of this excessive confidence in the part of the opposition, people who want to overthrow Maduro by any means possible. I think as a result, you have a big block of Venezuelans who don’t like Maduro at all, but feel kind of misled if not to see by the leaders of the opposition.

Ryan Morfin:

Or maybe they just don’t trust the opposition either to find a palatable, reasonable, like you said, immediate resolution for their needs. In some ways Venezuela is really a front line of … Well, maybe it’s a proxy war between great powers, but it seems to be economic warfare playing out. And maybe you can talk a little bit about kind of some of the tools that you’ve seen employed or whether it’s through the sanctions or the government trying to take back control of its trading relationships. What other kind of mechanical or policy implementations have been made that have kind of really effectuated the economic warfare going on?

Steve Ellner:

I think Washington perceives that the Chinese motivations are different, that they are more of an economic player than a political player. And so Washington, as well as Guaido and his people have attempted to convince the Chinese two things. One, that the Maduro government is a bad investment, that the Chinese will not get their return on the investments. As I mentioned before, Venezuela owes China approximately $60 billion, a lot of that in oil. And so that’s one of the arguments. And the other argument is that if Guaido comes to power, if the opposition comes to power in Venezuela, then those commitments on the part of the Venezuelan government will be honored. If China pulls back from the middle of government, if China withdraw support from Maduro, then Guaido will honor those commitments. So, up until now those arguments haven’t worked in case of China.

Steve Ellner:

China has indicated officially that China supports Venezuela. It’s not as vocal as Russia is. The Russian foreign minister attacks the United States for the sanctions against Venezuela. China is a little bit more laid back, but nevertheless has indicated support for Maduro. I think that may change under a new administration. If the confrontation between China and the United States softens just a little bit, I think China will look at Venezuela in more pragmatic terms and will make a decision, not on the basis of geopolitical factors, but on the basis of economic ones.

Ryan Morfin:

That is interesting. I mean, it is very much the front lines of a lot of different, interesting current events. Well, sir, I’d love to have you back on the show in the future as this continues to play out. I’m sure there’s going to be a lot of activity. It’s not one of those countries that’s going to be boring for any stretch of the imagination. So, we appreciate you coming on and would love to have you back in the future. Thank you for watching Non-Beta Alpha. Before we go, please remember to like, subscribe, on Apple podcasts [inaudible 00:44:10] channel. This is Non-Beta Alpha.

 

Share This Episode

Subscribe To Our Podcast!

COPYRIGHT 2020 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. THIS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFER TO BUY OR SELL ANY SECURITY; INVESTMENTS IN SECURITIES MAY NOT BE SUITABLE FOR ALL INVESTORS. AN INVESTMENT IN ANY SECURITY MAY INVOLVE RISK AND THE POTENTIAL LOSS OF YOUR INITIAL INVESTMENT. INVESTORS SHOULD REVIEW ALL “RISK FACTORS” BEFORE INVESTING. INVESTORS SHOULD PERFORM THEIR OWN DUE DILIGENCE BEFORE CONSIDERING ANY INVESTMENT. PAST PERFORMANCE IS NOT INDICATIVE OF FUTURE RESULTS. INVESTMENT PRODUCTS, INSURANCE AND ANNUITY PRODUCTS ARE NOT FDIC INSURED/NOT BANK GUARANTEED/NOT INSURED BY A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY/MAY LOSE VALUE. SECURITIES OFFERED THROUGH CABOT LODGE SECURITIES, LLC [CLS] MEMBER FINRA / SIPC 200 VESEY STREET, 24TH FLOOR, NEW YORK, NY 10281, 888.992.2268.

Recommended For You

Want to join our show?

Would you like to be a guest on the Non-Beta Alpha Podcast? Please click below and let us know that you are interested in being a guest on the podcast and we will get back to you shortly.

Skip to content